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Abstract
According to an argument by Colin Howson, the no-miracles argu-
ment (NMA) is contingent on committing the base-rate fallacy and is
therefore bound to fail. We demonstrate that Howson’s argument only
applies to one of two versions of the NMA. The other, more consider-
ate version remains unaffected by his line of reasoning. We provide a
formal reconstruction of that version of the NMA and show that it is
valid. Finally, we demonstrate that the use of subjective priors is con-
sistent with the realist implication of the NMA and show that a core
worry with respect to the suggested form of the NMA can be dispelled.
1 Introduction
The No Miracles Argument (NMA) is arguably the most influential argu-
ment in favour of scientific realism. First formulated under this name in Put-
nam (1975), the NMA asserts that the predictive success of science would
be a miracle if predictively successful scientific theories were not (at least)
approximately true. The NMA may be framed as a three step argument.
First, it is asserted that the predictive success we witness in science does not
have any satisfactory explanation in the absence of a realist interpretation of
scientific theory. Predictive success is often understood (see e.g. Musgrave
1988) in terms of the novel predictive success of science. It is then argued
that a realist interpretation of scientific theory can provide an explanation
of scientific success. Finally, abductive reasoning is deployed to conclude
that, given the first two points, scientific realism is probably true.
All three steps of NMA were questioned already shortly after its formulation.
It was argued that scientific success needs no explanation beyond what can
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be given in an empiricist framework (van Fraassen 1980), that scientific
realism cannot provide the kind of explanation of predictive success aimed
at by the realist (Laudan 1981) and that the use of abductive reasoning in a
philosophical context already presumes a realist point of view (Fine 1986).
The debate on all these points continues until this day.
In the year 2000, Colin Howson presented an interesting new line of criticism
(Howson 2000) that did not look at one of the three individual steps of the
NMA but questioned the overall logical validity of the argument. Howson
argued that a Bayesian reconstruction of the NMA revealed a logical flaw
in the argument’s structure: it commits the base-rate fallacy. Howson’s line
of reasoning was followed and extended in (Magnus and Callender 2003).
Attempts to counter Howson’s argument have been of two kinds. Some
defenders of the NMA have generally disputed the adequacy of a Bayesian
perspective on the NMA. Worrall (2007) has argued that the abductive
character of the NMA cannot be grasped by a Bayesian reconstruction.
In a similar vein, Psillos (2009) has argued that the subjective character of
priors is at variance with the spirit of realist reasoning. Therefore, so Psillos,
critically analysing a realist argument in a Bayesian framework that involves
prior probabilities amounts to begging the question by choosing an anti-
realist point of view from the start. Howson (2013) highlighted an inherent
problem of this argumentative strategy. In direct response to (Psillos 2009)
he pointed out that (i) a Bayesian perspective can in principle be based
on an objective concept of prior probabilities, which is not antirealist on
any account, and (ii) rejecting prior probabilities amounts to rejecting any
probabilistic understanding of a commitment to scientific realism. In the
absence of any reference to probabilities, however, it becomes difficult to
explain what is meant by the statement that one believes in scientific realism.
A second strategy has been to acknowledge the viability of Howson’s analysis
in principle but point to the limits of its range of applicability. As first em-
phasised in (Dawid 2008), the NMA can be formulated in two substantially
different forms. Menke (2014) and Henderson (forthcoming) have pointed
out that Howson’s base rate fallacy charge only applies to one of them but
not to the other.1
In this article, we formally spell out the latter position and demonstrate that
the analysis of the NMA can profit substantially from such a full formal re-
construction. We start with a rehearsal of Howson’s argument in Section 2.
Section 3 then specifies the two kinds of the NMA, which we will call individ-
ual theory-based NMA and frequency-based NMA. In Section 4, we present a
formalization of frequency-based NMA that demonstrates (i) that the indi-
vidual theory-based NMA is a sub-argument of the frequency-based NMA,
(ii) that Howson only reconstructs this sub-argument, and (iii) that the full
1A different specification of the NMA that avoids the base rate fallacy has been pro-
posed in Sprenger (2015).
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frequency-based NMA does not commit the base rate fallacy. In Section 5,
we argue that, while there is a strand in scientific realism that reduces NMA
to the individual theory-based NMA, Putnam and Boyd, the first main ex-
ponents of the argument, did clearly endorse the frequency-based NMA. The
final parts of the paper utilize the full formal reconstruction of the NMA
to clarify two important points on the nature of the NMA. In Section 6, it
is explained why the use of subjective priors poses no problem for the fre-
quency based NMA as a realist argument. Section 7 formally demonstrates
that a core worry with respect to a frequency-based understanding of the
NMA can be dispelled. Section 8 discusses a lottery analogy to support our
argument. Finally, Section 9 sums up the main results of this article.
2 Howson’s Argument
In his book Howson (2000), Colin Howson makes the remarkable claim that
the NMA commits the base-rate fallacy and therefore is invalid on logical
grounds. Howson provides the following Bayesian formalization of this ar-
gument: Let S be a binary propositional variable with values S: Hypothesis
H is predictively successful, and its negation ¬S. Let T be the binary propo-
sitional variable with values T: H is approximately true, and its negation
¬T. Next, the adherent of the NMA makes two assumptions:
A1: P (S|T) is quite large.
A2: P (S|¬T) < k  1.
A1 states that approximately true theories are typically predictively suc-
cessful, and A2 states that theories that are not at least approximately true
are typically not predictively successful. Note that ¬T is the so-called catch-
all hypothesis. For the sake of the argument, we consider both assumptions
to be uncontroversial, although anti-realists objected to both of them (see,
e.g., Laudan (1981) and Stanford (2006)). The adherent of the NMA then
infers:
C: P (T|S) is large.
As Howson correctly points out, the stated argument commits the base-rate
fallacy: C is only justified if the prior probability P (T) is sufficiently large.
This condition, however, is not in the set of assumptions. If it were, we
would beg the question because the truth of a predictively successful theory
would then be derived from the assumption that the truth of the theory in
question is a priori sufficiently probable, which is exactly what an anti-realist
denies.2
2Howson (2015) indeed calls the statement ’one should endorse the truth of an empir-
ically confirmed theory if one believes P (T) > P (S|¬T)’ the only valid conclusion from
NMA-like reasoning. However, since no reason for believing the stated relation is given,
this form of “NMA” cannot seriously be called an argument for scientific realism.
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3 Two Versions of the NMA
Does Howson’s formal reconstruction constitute a faithful representation of
the NMA? It has been pointed out in Dawid (2008) that two conceptually
distinct versions of the NMA have to be distinguished. They differ with
respect to the issue as to what exactly has to be explained by the realist
conjecture.3
The first version is the following: We consider one specific predictively suc-
cessful scientific theory. The approximate truth of that theory is then de-
ployed for explaining why it is predictively successful. We shall call a NMA
based on individual predictive success an individual theory-based NMA. Ac-
cording to the second version, what is to be explained by the realist con-
jecture is the observation that theories which are developed and held by
scientists tend to be predictively successful. In this version, the NMA does
not rely on the observation that one specific theory is predictively successful
but rather on an observed characteristic of science as a whole or at least
of a more narrowly specified segment of science. Theories that are part of
that segment, such as theories that are part of mature science or that are
part of a specific mature research field, are expected to be predictively suc-
cessful. We will call a NMA based on the frequency of predictive success
frequency-based NMA.4 Menke (2014) and Henderson (forthcoming) have
pointed out that Howson’s argument only addresses what we call individ-
ual theory-based NMA. The frequency-based version of the NMA is not
adequately represented by Howson’s reconstruction.
In the following section, we develop a formalization of frequency-based NMA
and therefore provide the basis for a fully formalized analysis of NMA. This
will help us to investigate how and to what extent the frequency-based
version of the NMA reaches beyond Howson’s reconstruction.
3In Dawid (2008), the two forms of the NMA are called “analytic NMA” and “epistemic
NMA”.
4A related but different distinction between two forms of NMA was made in (Barnes
2003). Barnes calls the argument from a theory’s success the “miraculous theory argu-
ment” and contrasts it with the “miraculous choice argument” from the scientists’ actual
development and choice of successful theories. The miraculous theory argument is nec-
essarily an individual theory-based NMA, since it presumes the predictive success of the
individual theory under consideration. Therefore, no frequency of predictive success can
be specified within the framework of the miraculous theory argument. A miraculous choice
argument may be either of the individual theory or of the frequency-based type.
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4 Formalizing Frequency-Based NMA
To begin with, we specify a scientific discipline or research field R.5 We
count all nE theories in R that have been empirically tested and determine
the number nS of theories that were empirically successful. We can thus
state the following observation:
O: nS out of nE theories in R were predictively successful.
Now let us assume that we are confronted with a new and so far empirically
untested theory H in R. We want to extract the probability P (S|O) for
the predictive success S of H given observation O. In order not to beg the
question by assuming the predictive success of H a priori, we assume a prior
probability P (S) = , where  can be arbitrarily small.
We then assume that each new theory that comes up in R can be treated
as a random pick with respect to predictive success. That is, we assume
that there is a certain overall rate of predictively successful theories in R
and that, in the absence of further knowledge, the success chances of a new
theory should be estimated according to our best estimate R of that success
rate:
P (S|O) = R (1)
R will be based on observation O. The most straightforward assessment of
R is to use the frequentist information and to identify R with
Rfreq =
nS
nE
. (2)
We will adopt it in the remainder. To proceed with our formal analysis
of the frequency based-NMA, we need to make two assumptions similar to
A1, A2:
AO1 : P (S|T,O) is quite large.
AO2 : P (S|¬T,O) < k  1
Note that scientific realists assume that the truth of H is the dominating
element in explaining the theory’s predictive success. If that is so, then S is
roughly conditionally independent of O given T and we have P (S|T,O) ≈
P (S|T) and P (S|¬T,O) ≈ P (S|¬T). The conditionsAO1 andAO2 can then be
roughly equated with the conditions A1 and A2. For the sake of generality,
we will nevertheless use conditions AO1 and A
O
2 in the following analysis.
5One might argue that a strong statement on predictive success in a research field R
always requires the specification of some conditions C that separate more promising from
less promising theories in the field. However, accounting for this additional step does not
affect the basic structure of the argument, which is why, in order to keep things simple,
we won’t explicitly mention these conditions in our reconstruction.
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Let us now come to our crucial point, viz. to show that accounting for ob-
servation O blocks the base-rate fallacy. The base-rate fallacy in individual
theory-based NMA consisted in disregarding the possibility of arbitrarily
small priors P (T). In frequency-based NMA, however, the crucial probabil-
ity is P (T|O) rather than P (T). Updating the probability of S on observa-
tion O has an impact on P (T|O). To see this, we start with the law of total
probability,
P (S|O) = P (S|T,O)P (T|O) + P (S|¬T,O)P (¬T|O), (3)
and obtain
P (T|O) = P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
P (S|T,O)− P (S|¬T,O) . (4)
(The proof is in Appendix A.) Two points can be extracted from eq. (4)
and assumptions AO1 and A
O
2 . First, we conclude that
P (S|T,O) ≥ P (S|O). (5)
In particular,
P (S|T,O) = P (S|O) iff P (T|O) = 1. (6)
Second, we obtain that
P (T|O) > P (S|O)− k = R− k . (7)
(The proof is in Appendix B.) Hence, P (T|O) is bounded from below if
k < R. This will typically be the case as (i) k is small (by assumption AO2 )
and (ii) R ≈ nS/nE (by eq. (2)) is large (see, however, our discussion in
Section 7). Thus, if a supporter of the NMA uses a form of assumption A01
that satisfies k < R, then the base-rate fallacy is avoided. Note that the first
and crucial inference in frequency-based NMA is made before accounting for
the predictive success of H itself and relies on relating P (S|O) to P (T|O)
based on the law of total probability.
Once H has been empirically tested and found to be empirically successful,
we can, just as in the case of individual theory-based NMA, update on S,
the predictive success of H.6 Using eqs. (5) and (6) and the identity
P (T|S,O) = P (S|T,O)
P (S|O) · P (T|O), (8)
it is easy to see that Bayesian updating from P (T|O) to P (T|S,O) further
increases the probability of T for predictively successful theories as long as
P (T|O) < 1.
6Note that the predictive success of H will change the value of R. However, this change
will be small if nE is large.
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Comparing this formalization of frequency-based NMA with Howson’s re-
construction, we see that Howson only reconstructs the second part of
frequency-based NMA, which leads from P (T|O) to P (T|S,O). He leaves
out the part where P (T|O) is extracted from the observed success frequency
nS/nE based on the prior P (T). Howson’s base rate fallacy charge crucially
relies on the understanding that the specification of the truth probability
before updating under the predictive success of the given theory is not part
of the NMA. Howson’s reconstruction thus is insensitive to the observed
frequency of predictive success and amounts to a formalization of individual
theory-based NMA.
We want to conclude this section with a clarificatory note on the status
of the suggested formalization. If a scientific realist asserts that a given
research field shows a significant frequency of predictive success, she thereby
expresses her understanding that an overall appraisal of the field justifies
such a claim. She normally is not in the situation to back up her claim
by providing a complete count of the successful and failed theories in the
field based on precise criteria for what counts as a theory. The presented
formalization does not suggest that they must provide such a list any more
than Bayesian confirmation theory suggests that scientists must carry out
Bayesian updating from explicitly specified priors of their theories. The role
of a formalization of the presented kind can only be to clarify the logical
structure of a given line of reasoning by offering a well-defined formal model
of it.
5 Do Realists Use Frequency-Based NMA?
The NMA has a long and chequered history. Who among its exponents
endorsed individual theory-based NMA and who endorsed its frequency-
based counterpart? Here is the precise wording of Hilary Putnam’s famous
first formulation of NMA:
The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philos-
ophy that doesn’t make the success of science a miracle. That
terms in mature science typically refer [. . . ], that the theories
in a mature science are typically true, that the same term can
refer to the same thing even when it occurs in different theo-
ries – these statements are viewed by the scientific realist not
as necessary truths but as the only scientific explanation of the
success of science and hence as part of any adequate scientific
description of science and its relations to its objects. (Putnam
1975, our emphasis)
Note that Putnam speaks of the success of science rather than of the success
of an individual scientific theory. He clearly understands the success of
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science as a general and observable phenomenon. Since he obviously would
not want to say that each and every scientific theory is always predictively
successful, he thereby asserts that we find a high success rate nS/nE based on
our observations of the history of (mature) science. He then infers from the
success of science that mature scientific theories are typically approximately
true. That is, he infers P (T|O) from the observed rate nS/nE . We conclude
that Putnam presented a clear-cut frequency-based version of NMA.
The other early main exponent of the NMA, Richard Boyd (see, e.g., Boyd
(1984) and Boyd (1985)), is committed to frequency-based NMA as well.
Boyd emphasize that only what he calls the “predictive reliability of well-
confirmed scientific theories” and the “reliability of scientific methodology
in identifying predictively reliable theories” provides the basis for the NMA.
In other words, an individual case of having predictive success could be
explained by good luck and therefore would not license a NMA. Only the
reliability of generating predictive success in a field, i.e. a high frequency of
predictive success, provides an acceptable basis for the NMA.
Later expositions of NMA at times are not sensitive to the distinction be-
tween individual theory-based NMA and frequency-based NMA and there-
fore are not clearly committed to one or the other version of the argument.
In some cases, Putnam’s phrase “success of science” is used at one stage
of the exposition while the thrust of the exposition seems to endorse an
individual theory-based NMA perspective. A classic example of this kind
is Musgrave (1988). Psillos (2009) defends individual theory-based NMA in
his attempt to refute Howson’s criticism of the NMA.
6 Subjective Priors and Scientific Realism
At this point we want to return to the issue of subjective priors. As described
in the introduction, Psillos has argued that the reliance of Bayesian confir-
mation theory on subjective priors renders it inherently antirealist from the
start. A similar point has been raised by Brian Skyrms (private communi-
cation) and arguably has generated doubts about the relevance of Howson’s
argument among a number of exponents of the scientific realism debate.
The core of the argument is the following. Bayesian confirmation relies
on prior probabilities of the hypotheses under scrutiny. In other words,
in a Bayesian framework even the most convincing set of empirical data
leads to an endorsement of the tested hypothesis only for a given range of
priors. This means that a Bayesian analysis always allows for avoiding a
given conclusion by choosing sufficiently low priors for the hypothesis in
question. Why should this be a lethal problem for (individual theory based)
NMA when it isn’t for scientific reasoning, which can be reconstructed in
Bayesian terms as well?
In order to answer this objection to Howson’s argument, one has to take a
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look at the reason why, from a Bayesian perspective, science can reach stable
and more or less objective conclusions despite the necessity of starting from
subjective priors. The reason is that, in standard scientific contexts, pos-
teriors converge under repeated empirical testing. Therefore, if one wants
to test a hypothesis, any prior probability that may be chosen in advance
(apart from dogmatic denial, which corresponds to a prior probability of
zero), can lead to posteriors beyond a probability threshold set for acknowl-
edging conclusive confirmation if a sufficient amount of data is collected.
The fact that science is modelled as allowing for an infinite series of em-
pirical testing therefore neutralizes the threat of subjective priors to the
reliability of scientific claims.
Howson’s claim that the NMA involves a base rate fallacy in this light
amounts to the claim that the evidence structure that enters the NMA is not
of the kind to be found in scientific testing. It does not project a series of
updatings under a sequence of observations like in scientific testing. Rather,
it relies on acknowledging exactly one characteristic of a given theory: its
novel predictive success. In Howson’s reconstruction of the NMA, there is
only one updating under the observation of predictive success. This, How-
son argues, is no adequate structure for establishing the hypothesis under
scrutiny as long as no limits to the priors are assumed. Since no anti-realist
would subscribe to such limits, the (individual theory-based) NMA cannot
establish scientific realism.
Understood in this way, Howson makes a crucial point about the individual
theory-based NMA. The problem of individual theory-based NMA is not
that the sample size happens to be 1. The problem runs deeper: individual
theory-based NMA does not provide a framework for the sample testing of
a rate of predictive success at all. The logic of the argument starts with
selecting a theory that is known to have made correct novel predictions.
The argument is not based on an observation about the research process
that has led up to developing and endorsing scientific theories but only on
an observation about the theory’s relation to empirical data. Since the
predictively successful theory is being selected ex post, individual theory-
based NMA provides no basis for establishing whether the predictive success
of the given theory is surprising – is “a miracle”, if you want – on any
account. To use an analogy, if one selects the winning ticket of a lottery
after the draw, the fact that it won is no surprise.
Frequency-based NMA, to the contrary, relies on an observation about the
research process: within a given field, scientific theories that satisfy a given
set of conditions happen to be predictively successful with a significantly
high probability. This observation is grounded in a series of individual ob-
servations of the predictive successes of individual theories. The empirical
testing of each theory serves as a new data point. The observation O of
a certain frequency of predictive success therefore is the result of a quasi-
scientific testing series. The probability P (T|O), which is extracted from
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O based on the law of total probability, can be decoupled from the prior
probability P (T) as it is inferred from a quasi-scientific testing series. The
mechanism of objectifying results that work in a scientific framework is also
applicable in the case of NMA: anyone who takes the available data to be
inconclusive can resort to further testing.
Specifically, if a certain number of data points are available for extracting O
and an anti-realist observer (who has a very low prior P (T) before observ-
ing predictive success in the field but, for the sake of the argument, accepts
conditions AO1 and A
O
2 ) considers the available amount of data too small for
overcoming her very small prior probability P (T), one can just wait for new
theories in the research context to get tested. If the additional data also sup-
ports a high frequency of predictive success, our anti-realist would at some
stage acknowledge that the empirical data has established realism.7 The
deep reason why frequency-based NMA avoids the base rate fallacy there-
fore lies in the fact that it provides a framework in which the convergence
behaviour of posteriors under repeated updating can be exploited.
7 Does NMA need a high Frequency of Predictive
Success?
References to success frequencies in the context of the NMA have been
avoided by a number of philosophers of science for one reason: it seemed
imprudent to ground an argument for realism on a claim that looked ques-
tionable. Given the many failures of scientific theories, it looked unconvinc-
ing to assert a high frequency of predictive success in any scientific field.
In this light, it is important to have a clear understanding of the success
frequencies that are actually required for having a convincing NMA. In the
following, we address this question within our formalized reconstruction.
The strength of the NMA is expressed by P (T|S,O). In order to make a
strong case for scientific realism, we demand that
P (T|S,O) > K, (9)
where K is some reasonably high probability value. K = 1/2 may be viewed
as a plausible condition for taking the NMA seriously. How does a condition
7The present analysis implies that the proposal by Menke (2014) to use NMA only
with respect to theories that show multiple predictive successes is not satisfactory. Since
Menke’s suggestion remains within the framework of individual theory-based NMA, it
does not solve the structural problem Howson is pointing to. A theory that happens to
make two novel predictions and is successful in both cases may be more likely to be true
than one with only one case of novel predictive success (albeit one may object to treating
instances of novel predictive success statistically as independent picks as it is proposed by
Menke). But individual theories just give us the predictions they happen to imply. There
is no perspective of a series of novel predictions that can be understood in terms of an
open series of empirical testing. Howson’s core objection thus remains valid.
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on P (T|S,O) translate into a condition on P (S|O) and therefore on the
(observed) success frequency R? Obviously, this depends on the posited
values of P (S|T,O) and P (S|¬T,O). Eqs. (4) and (8) imply that
P (T|S,O) = P (S|T,O)
P (S|O) ·
(
P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
P (S|T,O)− P (S|¬T,O)
)
. (10)
We know already that the NMA works only for P (S|O) < P (S|T,O). From
eq. (10) we can further infer (proof omitted) that, for fixed P (S|O) and
fixed P (S|¬T,O) < P (S|O), P (T|S,O) decreases with increasing P (S|T,O).
Therefore, it is most difficult for P (T|S,O) to reach the value K if P (S|T,O)
has the maximal value 1. It thus makes sense to focus on this case, which
gives
P (T|S,O) = 1
P (S|O) ·
(
P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
1− P (S|¬T,O)
)
. (11)
Condition (9) then turns into
1
P (S|O) ·
(
P (S,O)− P (S|¬T,O)
1− P (S|¬T,O)
)
> K, (12)
which leads to the following condition for P (S|O):
P (S|O) > P (S|¬T,O)
1−K +K · P (S|¬T,O) (13)
(The proof is in Appendix C.) For small P (S|¬T,O), a good approximation
of the condition expressed in eq. (13) is
P (S|O) > P (S|¬T,O)
1−K . (14)
For K = 1/2, we thus obtain
P (S|O) > 2P (S|¬T,O). (15)
In the large nE-limit, this implies
nS/nE > 2P (S|¬T,O). (16)
We thus see that we don’t need a high rate of predictive success in a scientific
field for having a significant argument in favour of scientific realism. The
ratio nS/nE may be small as long as it is larger than the assumed value
of P (S|¬T,O). In a sense, the understanding that the NMA needs a high
frequency of predictive success is based on the inverse mistake to the one
committed by the endorser of the individual theory-based NMA. While the
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latter only focuses on the updating under the novel predictive success of an
individual theory, the former does not take this updating into account.
The possibility to base a NMA on a small nS/nE is significant. Many argu-
ments and observations which lower our assessments of nS/nE in a scientific
field at the same time enter our assessment of P (S|¬T,O). Take, for exam-
ple, the following argument against a high ratio of predictive success. “Sci-
entists develop many theories which they don’t find promising themselves.
Clearly, those theories have a very low frequency of predictive success.” It
is equally clear, though, that most of these theories are false and therefore
lower P (S|¬T,O). Examples of this kind show that lines of reasoning that
isolate segments of the theory space where both nS/nE and P (S|¬T,O) are
very small provide a framework in which the claim nS/nE > P (S|¬T,O)
can make sense even if the overall value nS/nE in a research field is rather
unimpressive.
8 An Analogy
In conjunction, the analysis of Section 6 and the possibility to base a
frequency-based NMA on low success frequencies have an important con-
sequence: lines of reasoning that at first glance look like exemplifications of
individual theory-based NMA may allow for a frequency based understand-
ing and can be made valid on that basis. In the following, we discuss this
case in detail by spelling out the analogy between the NMA and the lottery
case that was already mentioned in Section 6.
Let us look at the case of a lottery with a winning chance of 10−6 (for
example based on one draw and 106 numbered tickets). Let us further
assume that some observers develop the hypothesis T that the lottery is
rigged and an employee has given away the winning number to a some
person in advance. One of those observers addresses person H who has
purchased the winning ticket and asks him: “the probability that you would
win without fraud was 10−6. What other explanation than fraud could
explain your win?”
The correct formal Bayesian response to that observer is: “You fell prey to
the base rate fallacy. Since you have not specified the prior probability of
fraud, your argument is invalid.”
Another way to respond is: “You did not even check whether the outcome
of the lottery was unlikely. In order to do so you have to look at the overall
winning rate for sold tickets. If all 106 tickets were sold that rate is 10−6
and there is nothing unusual about the process whatsoever.”
The two responses can be related to each other by considering an assess-
ment of the probability of fraud in the lottery. Someone who takes lottery
fraud to be a priori unlikely assumes that the probability that the winning
number was given away at all is small, let us say 1%. The probability that
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a random individual buyer was involved in a fraud therefore is of the or-
der 10−2/(number of buyers). If all tickets were sold, that probability is
10−6 × 10−2 = 10−8. In other words, the very high number of sold tickets
leads to a very low prior of fraudulent behavior by an individual buyer. This
turns committing the base rate fallacy into a disastrous mistake. Bayesian
updating under the observation E that buyer H won the lottery with re-
spect to the hypothesis T that H committed a fraud then leads from the
prior P (T) = 10−8 to the posterior P (T|E) = 10−2, which exactly resem-
bles the prior probability that the lottery was fraudulent. Committing the
base rate fallacy thus has led our observer to believe in fraud even though
fraud has remained as improbable as it was before the lottery results were
announced.
Let us now transform our example into a case of the individual theory based
NMA. We carry out the following transformation:
• Buyer → theory
• (Number of lottery tickets)−1 → chances of a false theory’s predictive
success
• Number of sold tickets → number of theories developed
• Being drawn in the lottery → being predictively successful
• The lottery is rigged → the theory is approximately true
What we get is an explication of how the individual theory based NMA
commits the base rate fallacy (with arbitrary choices of numbers, obviously).
Let us assume that a theory has predictive success to an extent that has
probability 10−6. Scientific realists develop the hypothesis T that the pre-
dictively successful theory H is approximately true. Exponents of the indi-
vidual theory based NMA point to theory H and ask: “The probability that
the theory is predictively that successful without being approximately true
is 10−6. What other explanation than the theory’s approximate truth could
explain its predictive success?”
The correct formal Bayesian response to the exponent of individual theory-
based NMA is: “You fell prey to the base rate fallacy. Since you have
not specified the prior probability of the theory’s approximate truth, your
argument is invalid.”
Another way to respond is: “You did not even check whether the occurrence
of predictive success of the observed degree is unlikely. In order to do so
you have to look at the overall rate of predictive success. If the number of
theories that have been developed in science is 106 there is nothing unusual
about the fact that a theory with the observed degree of predictive success
has been developed.”
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The two answers can be related to each other by considering an assessment
of the probability of approximately true theories in science. Let us take the
scientific antirealist to assume that the probability that there is a known
approximately true theory in science at all is small, let us say 1%. The
probability that a random theory, irrespectively of its success, is true there-
fore is of the order 0,01/(number of theories that have been developed). If
the number of theories that were developed is 106, that probability is 10−8.
Bayesian updating under the observation E that theory H was predictively
successful with respect to the hypothesis T that H is approximately true
then leads from the prior P (T) = 10−8 to the posterior P (T|E) = 10−2.
Committing the base rate fallacy thus leads the exponent of the individual
theory based NMA to believe in scientific realism even though scientific re-
alism has remained as improbable as it was before the predictive success of
H was observed.
We know already that the base rate fallacy can be avoided by formulating the
NMA in a frequency-based way. What we can see in our example, however,
is that this may even happen if the number of already known predictively
successful theories is just 1.
Going back to the lottery case, sophisticated observers might indeed check
how many tickets were sold and find out that the number was just 10.
This means that the outcome that there was a winning ticket at all was
indeed very improbable, namely 10−5. Updating on the observation that
there was a winning ticket then does strongly increase the fraud probability.
Assuming an a priori overall fraud probability of 10−2 now indeed leads to
the conclusion that fraud is very probable. A “scientific” test of the fraud
hypothesis can only be carried out, however, if the fraud is systematic and
occurs again in future lotteries. Only then a staunch believer in the purity
of lotteries could be convinced of the fraud hypothesis by establishing a rate
of wins in the lottery that is systematically too high.
Translating this into the NMA scenario, the exponent of the frequency-
based NMA may argue that the probability of a false theory’s stunning
predictive success would be so small that such stunning success is unlikely
to have occurred at all in the history of science. Even if this just involves
one example of predictive success, it is a frequency-based argument and
thus avoids the base rate fallacy. In order to be trustworthy, however, the
defender of the NMA must be ready to wait for further examples of similarly
stunning predictive success in science. If no other case ever occurred, the
significance of the first instance of stunning predictive success would at some
stage wane and the early stunning success would have to be viewed as a
statistical fluke.
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9 Conclusions
The following picture of the role of the base rate fallacy with respect to the
NMA has emerged. Howson’s argument decisively destroys the individual
theory-based NMA, which has been endorsed by some adherents to NMA
and clearly was not understood to be logically flawed by many others. This
is an important step towards a clearer understanding of the NMA and the
scientific realism debate as a whole. However, the individual theory based
NMA is only one part of the NMA as it was presented by Putnam and
Boyd. The full argument, which we call the frequency-based NMA, does
not commit the base rate fallacy.
A clearer understanding of what the base rate fallacy amounts to in the con-
text of the NMA can be achieved by phrasing it in terms of the convergence
behaviour of posteriors. An argument commits the base rate fallacy if it (i)
ignores the role of the subjective priors and if it (ii) does not offer a perspec-
tive of convergence behaviour under a sequence of updatings under incoming
data. The individual theory-based NMA is structurally incapable of provid-
ing such a sequence of updatings because it addresses only the spectrum of
novel predictions provided by one single theory. The frequency-based NMA,
to the contrary, is based on a general observation about the research process
(the frequency of predictive success in a research field) that can be tested by
collecting a sequence of data points, where each data point corresponds to
the observed novel predictive success of an individual theory. Therefore, the
process of testing the hypothesis “theories that have novel predictive success
are probably true” under the assumptions AO1 and A
O
2 is of the same type
as scientific testing and does not commit the base rate fallacy.
One worry about the frequency-based NMA is related to the understand-
ing that the high frequencies of predictive success necessary for having a
convincing NMA cannot be found in actual science. The formalization of
the frequency-based NMA demonstrates that such high frequencies are not
necessary for achieving high truth probabilities with respect to theories with
novel predictive success.
To end with, let us emphasise one point. This paper has shown that the
NMA, if correctly reconstructed, does not commit the base-rate fallacy and
does not require a high overall frequency of predictive success. Those results
are not sufficient for demonstrating the soundness of the NMA, however. A
supporter of the frequency-based NMA must justify assumptions AO1 and
AO2 and must still explain on which grounds she takes a sufficiently high
frequency of predictive success to be borne out by the data. Whether or not
that can be achieved lies beyond the scope of this article.
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A Derivation of Eq. (4)
We use the law of total probability and obtain:
P (S|O) = P (S|T,O)P (T|O) + P (S|¬T,O)P (¬T|O)
= P (S|T,O)P (T|O) + P (S|¬T,O) · [1− P (T|O)]
= P (T|O) · [P (S|T,O)− P (S|¬T,O)] + P (S|¬T,O)
Hence,
P (T|O) = P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
P (S|T,O)− P (S|¬T,O) .
Here we have used that P (S|T,O) > P (S|¬T,O), which follows from as-
sumptions AO1 and A
O
2 .
B Derivation of Eq. (7)
We start with eq. (4) and obtain
P (T|O) = P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
P (S|T,O)− P (S|¬T,O)
≥ P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
1− P (S|¬T,O)
≥ P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O) (17)
> P (S|O)− k. (18)
Here eq. (17) follows from assumptions AO1 and A
O
2 and eq. (18) follows
from assumption AO2 .
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C Derivation of Eq. (13)
We start with eq. (12) and obtain:
1
P (S|O) ·
(
P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)
1− P (S|¬T,O)
)
> K
1
P (S|O) · (P (S|O)− P (S|¬T,O)) > K (1− P (S|¬T,O))
1− P (S|¬T,O)
P (S|O) > K (1− P (S|¬T,O))
1−K (1− P (S|¬T,O)) > P (S|¬T,O)
P (S|O)
P (S|O) · (1−K(1− P (S|¬T,O))) > P (S|¬T,O)
Hence,
P (S|O) > P (S|¬T,O)
1−K +K · P (S|¬T,O) .
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